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Pursuantto Rule 37.2(b) of the Rules of this Court, The
Arc of the United States,el al., move the Court for leave to
file a Brief Amici Curiae in support of the petition in the
above-entitled case. Counsel for Petitioner has granted his
consentto the filing of this brief. CoWlselfor Respondent,
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notified coWlselfor amici that Respondentdoes
not consent
Amici include national and stateprofessionaland voluntary
associationsconcerned with criminA1proceedings affecting
people with mental disabilities. Amici thus have expertise
concerning criminal defendantswith mental disabilities and
the impedimentsto fajr judicia] processeswhich will result if
those defendants are required to prove their mental retardation beyond a reasonabledoubt

A mici wish to offer the Court relevant infol'Ulattonon the
historicaJ development of the beyond a reasonabledoubt
standard,and why it cannot be applied to a defendant'seffort
to invoke the constitutional protection of Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). Amici also wish to presentinfOIInation
on contemporary practices and standards when the State
imposes a burden of persuasionon defendantswith mental
retardationwho may face execution.
Amici believe that the Georgia statute, providing that
crimi1:!a1defendants must prove their mental retardation
beyond a reasonable doubt to invoke the protections of
Aikins, impennissibJyobsbucts the fair adjudication of such
constitutional claims.
For the above-statedreasons, we respectfully lU'ge the
Court to grant this motion for leave to file the accompanying
brief in the present case in support of the petition for
certiorari.
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CHRISTIANG. FRITZ
1117 Stanford. NE
Albuquerque. NM 87131
(50S) 277.2146
Counsel for Amici Curiae

QUEsnON PRESENTED
Whether, under the Due Process Clause, a defendant
seekingto avoid executionpursuantto Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), may be required to prove his or her mental
retardationbeyonda reasonabledoubt.
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INTHE

iJ,upreme ~ourt of tIJt mnittb .&tateJ'
No. 03-1392
ALPHONSO STRIPLING,

Petitioner,

v.
FREDRICK HsAD, Warden,
GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION PRISON,
Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ Of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Georlia

BRIEF OF THE ARC OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE AMERICAN ASSOCJADONON MENTAL
RETARDAnON, THE JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON
CENTER FOR :MENTALHEAL TH LAW,
THE ARC OF GEORGIA,AND THE GEORGIA
ADVOCACY OFF1CE;ASAMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORTOF PETITIONER

INTERESTOFAMIa

1

Amici are national and Georgia disability org8Dizations
with a longstanding concern about the prospect that defendantswith mental retardationmight be executed.
1 This

brief was written entirely by counsel for amici, as listed on the

COVet,and nO{ by counsel for any party, No outside contn'butionswere
made to the preparation or submissionofd11sbrief.

2
The Arc of the United States (formerly known as the
Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States).
through its nearly 900 state and local chapters,is the largest
national voluntary organization in the United Statesdevoted
solely to the welfare of the more than sevenmillion children
and adults with mental retardationandthcir families.
The American Associ4tioll 011 Mental RetaTdlltlon
(AAMR). founded in 1876, is the nation's oldest and largest
interdisciplinary organization of professionaJsin the field of
mental retardation.
Th~ Judge David L. Bazeloll Centerfor Menm/ Health
LtlHI (Bazelon) is a national public interest organization
founded in 1972 to advocatefor the rights of cmldrcn and
adults with mental disabilities.
The At'C of Georgia is an affi'Jia!ro state chapter of The
Arc of the United States. In 1987 and 1988, The Arc of
Georgja was the principal advocatefor legislation prohibiting the execution of individuals with mental retardation
in Georgia.
The Geol'giJlAdvOC4cyOffICe(GAO) is the protection and
ad\'ocacy system for individuals with disabilities, designated
by the Governor of the State of Georgia pursuantto federal
statute and regulations. GAO is authorizedto advocatefor
and protect the rights of individuals, monitor conditions, and
investigatepotential incidents of abuseand neglect in private
or public facilities and in the communityThe Arc of the United States,AAIvIR, and Ba:lelon have
appearedas amici curiae on the merits in almost all of the
cases in which this Court has addressedissues involving
mental retardation over the last three decades, including
Atkins ~ in the CUITentTenn, Tennard \I. Dretke (No. 0210036). Theseorganizationsdo not regularJyfiJe briefs either
supporting or opposing petitions for writs of certiorari. But
based on their members' experiencein the adjudication of

3
Atkins cases in Georgia, as well as in other States, and
becauseof the unusual importanceof thjs issue,amici depart
from their ordinary practice and urge this Court to grant
the petition.
Disability organiz~tions,including amici and their chapters
in numerous States.have been actively involved in helping
state governments define mental retardation and devise
proceduresto implementAtkins. In eachStatewith the death
penalty, disability advocateshave been providing assistance
to legislaturesin crafting the rules and standardsunder which
mental retardation issues will be adjudicated. In States in
which the legjslatmeshave Dot yet acted,disability organizations have participated, as amici. in the processesby which
state courts have fashionedjudicial remedies. This effort by
disability organizations and advocatesdirectly parallels the
role that such groupsplayed in enactinglegislation on mental
retardation and the death penalty in those States(including
Georgia)that actedprior to this Court's decisionin Atkins.4
State legislatures and courts have looked to disability or~
ganizationsfor assistancenot only becauseof their expertise
on the nature of mental retardation, but also becauseclinicians and professionals from these orsani:zationswilt be
called upon to provide the individual evaluations and testimony that will assistin the adjudication of individual cases.
Legislatorsandjudges in the Stateshave beeneagerto ensure
that the telminology and proceduresadoptedwould facilitate
the work of these professionals in assisting trial cowts in
implementingAIkins.
The interest of the djsabiljty organizationsin these efforts
on the state level is the same basic interest that drew them
into their role in this Court's considcrationof caseslikc Penry
2SeegenerallyJamesW. Enis, Disability Advocacyand the Death
Penalty: 7JreRoadfrol1lPenry to ..4tki7lS,33 N.M. L. R.sv. 173, 176-77
(2003).

4
\I. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), andAtkins, and now brings
them to supportthe petition jn this case:assuringthe fair and
dispassionateconsideration of clinical information in the
casesof capital defendantswho may have mental retardation.
This fundamental concern for fairness in these casesleads
amici to a more partjcularized concern: that no defendants
who offer evidence indicating mental retardation should be
confronted with unfair procedural obstacles that would
prevent the even-handedevaluation of their Eighth Amendment claims.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), this Court heJd
that defendantswho have mental retardation are protected
from execution by the Eighth Amendment. It then entrusted
to the States the jnitial task of developing "appropriate
procedures"for the protection of this constitutional right. ld.
at 317- Whjle the vast majority of the proceduresadoptedby
the various States arc consistent 'With fair adjudication of
Atkins claims, Georgia's requirement that dcfcndantsprave
their own mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt
violates the fund~I'!!~ta1principles of dueprocesS.3

3

Petitioner presemsco:ent lr:UI1Jentson both (1) tile Georgia

Sup~e Court's clearly erronoousinterpretation ofd1is Court's opmions.
and (2) the ineonsistencyof the Georgia court's TeuOningwith mat of the
courts of other StatBi Rgarding the burdon of persuasion.particularly in
those Statesadopting,the standard of clear and convincing evidence. In
this brief, amici will only addrcssthe precise issue posedby tile Question
Prcsentcd, I.e., the p~eDt
of tbe burden 04 defendantsat beyond a
reasonable doubt. Were the Court to grmt the petition, it could, of
C~,
c)mfy its int~-ntionto address 0l11ythe constitUtionality of the
Georgia bw-den, and not broader questions which might arise in those
Statesthat employ a test of clear and COftvincm,evidcnoe. Seegenerally
A.Jhwana'erv. Tenness" Valley Autho,lty, 297 U.S. 288. 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., conclDTing).

5
As this Court's use of the term "appropriate" signifies, the
proce~
that Statesadopt to implementAtkins must satisfy
the require,nentsof the Due ProcessCJause- Georgia's requirement that capital defendantsprove their own mental
retardation beyond a Jeasonabledoubt cannot be reconciled
with the central tenetsof dueprocess.
The reasonabledoubt standard historically has been reserved for the Statc's burden of proof in criminal trials.
Imposingso heavy a burden on capital defendantsseeking
the protection of a rccognizedconstitutionalright is unprecedented. No other Stateemploysthis test in mental retardation
cases,and there are few instances,if any, in which a State
imposesthis burdenon defendantswith regardto any issue.
This Court~sDue ProcessClausecasesare consistentwith
the history of the reasonabledoubt test and with the pattern of
contemporarypractice. The reasonabledoubt burden creates
a constitutionally unacceptable risk that defendants with
mental retardationwill be executed.and the Statehas offered
no countervailing interestsufficient to justify that risk.
ARGUMENT
L

SINCE THE ATKINS DECISION TRANSFORMED PROTECTION OF DEFENDANTS
wnu
MENTAL RETARDA110N INTO A
CONS11TU110NAL RIGHT, STATES MUST
NOW IMPLEMENT THAT RIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS.

In Atkins, this Coun recognizedthat the execution of auy
individual who has mentaJ retardation would violate the
PlmishmentsClauseof the Eighth Amendment. As with the
issue of competenceto face execution,the Court entrustedto
the States, in the first instance, "the task of developing
appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction"
on this category of executions. 536 U.S. at 317 (emphasisadded).

6

In ~poDSC to this directive, most Stateswith laws that
provide for the death penalty have enacted a statutory
definition of mental rctardation and proceduresfor the adjudication of cases,or have had such proceduresprescn"bedby
their State's highest court. And while theselaws differ from
one another in several respects, the vast majority of the
issuesJ1ave~n addressedin a thoughtful and even-handed
fasbion,4 andthus do not raise constitutionalconcerns.
Georgia's decision, however, reqmrlng capital defendants
to prove that they.have mental retardation at the reasonable
doubt standardinvolves constitutional concernsof the highest
magnitude.
A. This Court' 5 Decision in Atkins Recognizesa
Fundamental CoDStitutiOD81
Right.
Atki1lSclearly cstablishesthat defendantswho have mental
retardationcannot,consistentwith the Eighth Amendment,be
sentencedto death. The Court based its holding both on a
growing body of evidence of a national conscnsusagainst
such executionsand upon its own "independentevaluationof
the issue." 536 U.S. at 321. The opinion concludod that
"such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution
places a substantiverestriction on the State's power 10 take
the life of a mentally retardedoffender." Id (intemaJquota60n omitted).
By recogni7:ingthis Eiibth AmeDdmentright, tho Court
transformed what had been an optional policy choice within
the discretion of the States into a constitutional m~'!date.
Prior to Atkins, Stateswere free 10 offer 9tatutoIYprotection
to capital defendants with mental retardation (as eighteen
Stateshad alreadydone), or not. This Coun's decisionfunda4

See ,.".,a/ty JamesW. Ellis, Mtnlal Retard4tionand die Death

PenDlry: A. GWdc 10 Siala-L4gi.rlativ. J.r.nIa, 27 MeNTAL &: PHYSICAl.

~D.rrYLAWREPOR'I'&.RII (2003)(hereinafter"ugi.rl«tv, GulU).

7
mentally alteredthat situation. Obviously, for Statesthat had
previously permitted the executionof individuals with mental
retardation,it was made clear that they can no longer do so.
But it is equally clear that, for those Stateswhoselegislatures
had already chosen not to execute such individuals. the
recognition that this discretion8IYchoice is now a constitutional commandmeansthey must adjudicateclaims of mental
retardation in accordancewith the Due ProcessClauseof the
FourteenthAmendment.5
B. Due Process Requires that Constitutional
Rights Be Administered Consistent with
Principles of FundamentaJFairness.
While this Court has observedthat due processis generally
a flexible concept that does Dot apply uniformly "to every
imaginable situation," Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), the
States do not have unreviewable discretion in limiting
individuals' access to constitutionally protected rights.
ClevelandBoard of Education v. Loudennill, 470 U.S. 532,
541 (1985) ("The riJht to due process is conferred, not by
legislative grace, but by constitutional ~~.
") (intcmal
citation omitted). And '"becaus~th~ Stateshave considerable
expertise

. . . grounded in centuries of common law tradition, "

th~ Court bas excrcised "substantial deferenceto legislative
judgm~nts" in the area of criminal procedure. Medina v.
California, 50S U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992). This deference,
however, has not been limitless. See,e.g., Cooper v. Okla5

And asthis Court has observed.since "the minimum requirements"'of

procedunl d\le processare a matter of fedm-allaw, '"they arc not dimInished by me fict that the State may have specified its own proceduresthat
it may deem adequatefor determinJD;the preconditionsto adverseofficial
action. Moreover, the degree of proof requilod in a particu1art)lP8 of
procecding is the kind of question which has traditionally bccn lcft to thc
judiciary to resolve." Samosky\I. Kramel", 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982)
(internal citations and quotationsomitted).

8
homa. 517 U.S. 348 (1996). And it certainly is not an
invitation to the Statesto employ proceduresthat will have
the effect of rendering recognizedsubstantiveconstitutional
rights inaccessibleto defendantswho are entitled to their
protection.6
D. DUE PROCESS PROHIBITS GEORGIA FROM
REQUIRING
CAPrr AL DEFENDANTS TO
PROVE THEIR OWN MENTAL RETARDATION BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
A. There Are No Historieal Preccdcnts for
Requiring Capital Defendants to Provet Beyond
a Reasonable Doubt, Their EHgibility for
RecoenizedConstitutional Protections.
This Court's caseshave emphasi2ed"historica] practice,"
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 356, as a guidepost in deteIn1iningthe
requirementsof due process. Since the precise question in
Atkins cascslacks direct lineal antecedentsin early American
and English legal history, the historical inquiry must be
somewhatdifferent than the Cooper analysis: But the genG

l..~lanJv. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (J9$2), is not to the contrary. In that

case,the COUltclearly noted tile distincdon betWeencoDStitUtlonalrights
and d~retionary statepolicies: "Nor is this a casein which it is soughtto
enforce against dte states 42right which we have held to be secm-edto
dcfcndantl in federal courts by the Bitl of Rights." fd at 798 (emphasis
added). While amici expressno view as to whedler, in some futUre case,
the Court should addressthe constitutional status of the iDsanitydcfmse,
it is absolutely clear that no ~e had recognizedsuch a right at the time of
Leland. clearly distinaujshJng that casc D-om the cue at bar. s~
gmvaliy Medina, 50.5U.S. at 449; Foucha v. Louisiana, S04 U.S. 71, 8889 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in pm and concuIrinJ in the
judgment); Ak. v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 91 (J985) (Rehnquist, I.,
dissenting).
7 As this Court bas observed, thcrc is some parallel for a subset of
defcodanta with mental ~datiOD to the hiStorical prohibition against
punishing "idiots." Penry, 492 U.S. at 332-33. But since this represented
a preclusion of any punishment, IUd not just the death penalty (although,

Wl1son-Epes Prlnt

9
era! history of the developmentof the beyond a rcasonablc
doubt standardis, nonethclcss,illuminating.
The reasonabledoubt standardwas developedto quantify
the level of evidencerequired of the prosecutionin criminal
trials. As this Court observed,"jts cIYStallizationinto [its
CUITCnt
forDlula] seemsto have occurredas late as 1798." In
re Winship.397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).8 Seegenerally Victor
v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1. 10-13 (1994). Thc purpose of
placing so heavy a burden on the pro5ecution was to
implement the maxim that it is preferablefor multiple guilty

admittedly, the death penalty was far more perVasivc in earJicr centlDies),
the aoalo&}' regarding the burden of penuasion is somewhat more
attenuated here than it was in Coop"'.
. More recent historical scho1arship, while providing greater detail.
conftnns tbis general observation. See, e.g., Thomas Andrew ~
VERDICT AC~1)TNO TO CoNSCIENCE: PER.sPBCI'IVBSON nIE ElI/OUSH
CR.JMrNAI.TRJAL 1URY, 1200-1800, at 286 (198.5); Barb8I'a 1. Sbapiro,
"BJiYOND R.EASONABLEDOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL
P2RSPECTIVCS ON nIE ANGLo-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 1-41 (1991);
Anthony A, MOraDO. A Reaaminalion
of the Development of the
R.asonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.T.)'.L R.sv. 507 (1975); Bafbara 1. Shapiro,
"To A Moral C81'tatnt)In: ]Mories 01 Know/edge and AngJo-AlllNican
Juriu 1600-1850, 38 HAmNos U, 1S3 (1986). S~ g"nualiy BBrb8l1.1.
Shapiro, A CUL11JRE OF FJ\CT: ENaLAND, 1550-1720, at 8~33 (2000);
Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphosis of RlasonabJ. Doubt: How Changes
in the BwoUn 01 Proof Have W6a.ken6dthe Prasvmption of Inn~~.
78
N(JTRE DAME L. REV, 1165, 1183~1204 (2003). Indeed. en even earlier
inStBnce of the formulation is found in Robert T~t Paino's argwncnt for
dte Crown in the Boston ~
trial of 1770: "[1]£ dtere-for in the
examination of this Cause the Evidence is not sufficient to Convince
beyond reasonable Doubt of the Guih of aD or any of the Prisoners by the
Benignity and Reason of the Law you wiD acquit them, but if thc
Evidence be S1Jfficlent to convince you of thcir Guilt beyond reasonable
Doubt the Justice of the Law will require you to declare them Guilty and
the BenlgJlil)' of the Law win be I8tjsfyed in tho faUuess and impartiaUty
ofthoir Tryal"
3 LEGAl. PAPERSOF JOHN ADAMS 271 (L. Kmvjn Wroth
& HIller B. Zobel cds., 1965).

aO19

defendants to be ~uittcd,
defendantto be convicted.9

10
rather than for one innocent

The highly elevated level of certainty demandedby the
reasonabledoubt standardwas the principal reasonfor resistance, as earJy as the nineteenthcentury. to extending it to
civil casesor to placing it on partjcs other than prosecutors,!0
With very few exceptions, that resistancecontinues to the
presentday.
B. Contemporary Practice in thc States Rejects
ImposinS the Reasonable Doubt Burden on
Crimina] Defendants.
After more than two centuriesof its use as a standardfor
prosecutorialproof, thc reasonablcdoubt standardis seldom
placed on any party other than thc State in a crimina!
proceeding. There are few instancesin modern criminal law
when defendants are ever tequired to bear a bm-den of
persuasionabove preponderanceof the evidence,!! and none
of theseinvolves recognizedfederal constitutionalrights.
~ See J.W. May, Som~ R1l1u of Evidence.'ReasonableDoubt in Civil

(InQ'Criminal Cases, 10 AM. L. REv. 642, 653-54 (1876) (discussingthe
relationshjp of tbe cvidentiary standard to vacations on the maxim from
HaJeto Blackstone).
10See 1 Simon Greenleaf, A TREATISEON THELAw OF EVIDENCE
158-60 (16th ed., revised, eDlaraed, and annotated by John Hemy
Wigmore. J899).
II A few Statesmay require defmdants to meet the clear and convi~-

i!\J evidence S1aJ1dard
when offering certain Bffinnative defenses,see.
_.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.ANN. § /3-206(8) (West 2001) (en1rapIDent),but
amici are unawareof state laws rcquiJins defendantsto bear a reasonable
doubt bLD"den
in s\lch cirCWDStan~. Seegenerally ADnotarion.Bruden of
Proof as 10Entrapment DafBnse--StateCa.Ju. 52 ALR.4dJ 775 (1987).
Federal law and severBJStates require defendants to bear a clear and
convinci11&cvidenceb\D"dcnfor the insanity defense,su, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
17 (2000); T£NN-CODEANN. § 39-11-501 (2003). However, despnc die
constitutional latitude afforded by Leland. It appears rh81 few. jf any.
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More directly relevant, of course,is that no other Start'S
legislo.ture,either before or after:AIkins, haschosento place a
reasonabledoubt burden of demonstratingmental retardation
on a capital defendant. Similarly. no court in any other State,
in devisiDI proccd~ to implement Atkins, bas imposed a
reasonabledoubt burden on defendantsseeking to demonstratethat they have mental retardation.12 Indeedthe Georgia
Supreme Court itselj; in prescribing procedures for postconviction mental retardationcapjtaJcases,placesthe burdm
of ~ion
on the defendantby 0.prtponderance of 1he
evidence,I)
Thus, it is clear that the novel and Wlique14Georgia requirement that defendantsprove their own mental retardation
States CUn'eDdy~uire dcfeodaalS ro prove insanity 8t the IasODablc
doubt level. Sea 4 Michael L. Porlin, MENTALDISABILITYLAW: CJVIL
AND CRIMINAL 183 (2d od. 2002). Oreeon abandonedthe reasonable
doubt standardwithin five yoars oflhis Court's decJsionIn L,Iand. 19S7
OR.l..Aws 380.
12SIC. 1.1., Murphy\I. Stall, 54 P.34 "6, '68 n.20 (OkIL Crim. App.
2002). Seealso id at $73 Do7 (Chapol. J., concurrinl in result).
13 F/GPling
v. ZmIt, 386 S.E.24 339, 342-43 (GL 1989) (interprwting
state constitution's prohibition on "~el

aOO unusual p\D1ishmenr').

Amici find dle Gcorp SuprcmcCoUrt's8acmpt to cxptain this pa1'8dOX
~inari1y
Wlpersuasive. See BIIrgeJ;r v. Slale. 450 S.E.2d 680,
694-9~ (Ga. 1994).
1AAs the fir$t StBte to CI1ad a statute proh1"bimgthe executIon of
dc!'-endantswith mental mudation, ,.. Atkinr, 536 U.S. at 313-1~,
Georgia's legisl8bD"8Jackedthe benefit of statutory models from omer
States. Geor:ia chose to craft the prohibitioll 01It0its existing statutory
provision for a "Guilty But Mcnta1ly Dr' verdict. se. gcnea/ly BTadlcy
D. McGraw eI al., 11Ie "GtdJty But MnaiJy 111" PI60 and Verdict:
CW7'BntStatt ofthl Knowl,..
30 VILt...1.- Rsv. I J7 (J985); HaIrY J.
Steadmanel a/., BEFOREANDAFI'ER.HDIlCnEY: EvALUA~
tNSANITY
DEFENSE
REFORM102-120 (1993) (~tcr
7: The Impact of AdoptiDca
Guilty bill MCI1I8l1ym verdict in GeoIgia).
Because Georgia's pTOtectionof dcfend8nts with mental ~OD
wu framed in the fonn of a vet'rlict of pi/ty, $- GA. COOEANN. § 17~7~
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beyond a reasonable doubt can find DO support in
"contemporary
practice."SeeCooper,517U.S.at 360.JS
C. Standards of Fundamental Faines. Prohibit
States from Requiring Capi1*-1Defendant. to
Prove Their Eligi~ility fOr AtlcillS Protection
Beyond a ReasonableDoubt.
This Court held in Cooper that" in addition to surveying
historical precedentsand contemporarypracti~ the Court
may also independentlyevaluatethe fundamentalfairnessof
a procedural burden imposed upon defendants. 517 U.S. at
362. See also M~dbra, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Connor, J~
concUJlingin the judgment). Such an evaluationin this case
yields dramaticand disturbing results.
The essenceof the Georgia burden is that defendantswho
have mental retardation, and who are, therefore, entitled to
protection from the deathpenalty underAtkins, will havetheir
claims rejected unless they can prove beyond a reasonabJe
doubt that their disability meets the definition of mental
retardation. As a result, if the evidenceof mental retardation
presentedby the defendantpersuadesthejury by a preponderance of the evidence,the defendantwill still be senrencedto
d~ath. Indeed, if the defense persuadesthe jury of the
131(cX3)(1997), and smceiUilty verdictsare 1J'aditionaJlyassociated
with the reUODBbledoubt staDda'd, it Is certainly CODccivable
that dIere
may have been some confusIon at the time of enactment about the
appropriateburden for the statme.
It is noteworthy that while more thin two dozm Stites have followed
OeorIia.s subStantivelead (both before AIkins ~ since) in protecting
defendantswith mental ~dation,
110Mhas modeled iu enactment on
Georgia's statute,as to either the verdict fOlDl or die bUldcn ofproof.
15

"The fact that a practicei, followedby a largenumberof statesis

Dotconclusivein . d~jsion as to

wbecher that pr8CbCCaccords with due

proc:css.bllt it is plainly wonh considering in determining" whether a
right i& fiDldamemal. Uland. 343 U.S. at 798.
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defendant'smental retardation,even at the level of clear and
coDvincing evidence, the defendant will still be sP~~
to death.
Thus, the lik~1ihoodthat a defel1dantwho bas mental retardation will be sentencedto death is not limited to "a narrow
classof caseswhere the evidenceis in equipoise,"in which it
is equally likely that the defendant does or does not have
mental retardation. See Medina, SOSU.S. at 449. Rather,
there is a very substantial Iikehnood, indeed almost a
certainty, that over time, Georgia will executean individual
who has mental retardation, but who has failed to persuade
thejury of that fact beyond a reasonabledoubt. Such a result
cannot be squaredwith this Court's teachingsregarding the
Eighth Amendmentandthe Due ProcessClause.
Both the definition of mental retardationand the nature of
clinical evaluation and testimOnYare consistent with thjs
conclusion. Mental retardation,unlike mental illness, bas an
objectively measurabledisability at its core, t.e., the impairment of cognitive fmlctioning that is identifiable through IQ
testing. But in interpreting thosepsychometricm~urcmcnts
(particularly where the individual may have a scorenear the
boundary of the definition), and even more crucially in
evaluating the impainnents iJI adaptive fimctionini that the
definition also rcqWres,16professionalclinical judgment will
be an essential pan of the assessment.
17 And, just as the
7

16The

Georgia Sta1U\o'sdcfiDition, which mnicl be1iew is

constitutionally
acceptable, dC$Cr1DCStbia ~ent
in tem1S of
"impalnncnts in Idaptive behavior."
01'.. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(a)(3)
(J997). Some other States' formulations ofthc definition. d£8cribing die
same adaptive requiromcnt. use somewtlBt diff8r81t tem\iDoJo~.
S~
ugi.Jlalive Grlide, .nIprano~ 4, at 12.J4.
17Sa g0t6a!ly AAMR. MDolTAl. RETARDATJa.l: I)EFno.lT10N.CLASS..
FICA-nON. AND SYSTI!MB OF SUPPORTS93-96 (10th cd. 2002); AmeriC8l1
Paycbological .A~~iatlOD, MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PaoFiSSJONAJ.
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Court has noted with regard to the government'sburden in
civil commitment cases, a "serious question" exists as to
whether any defendantcould eVer prove mental retardation
beyond a reasonabledoubt. SeeAddington v. Texas,441 U.S.
418,429 (1979).1.
As the CoUrt observedin Atkins, not every defendantwho
claims to have mental retardation "will be so impaired as to
fall within" the definition. 536 U.S. at 317. Statecourts will
have the task of adjudicating individual claims that a defendant is entitled to At'ki1lsprotection. Georgia now insists19
that these individuals should be executed jf their proof of
PRACTIcE[N MENTAL RErARDATlON113-191 (John W. Jacobson &;
JamesA. Mull" ods.. 1996).
'8 Regarding mcntal illness, thc Addington Com also obscrvcd that

"[tJhe5ubtleties
aDdn~..

of ps)'Chialric
diagnOlis
render certainties

viI1ua1ly beyond reach in most Sttuat1ons.The rea8ombJe-doubtstandard

of aiminaI law functions in its realm because th«e the StaDdardis
addrcssedto specific, knowable facts. Psy~ic
diaBDOsis,in contrast.
is to a largE extent basedon medical 'impressions' dra'\'n &om subjective
analysis and fihered d\TOuahme oxperieoce of me d~osticiln."
441
U.S. at 430. As noted above, d~osis of m~ta1 retardatiODincludes
more objcativc indicia d1an is the case ~
mental illness. But the
Court's obsenations about the \IDJ\litability of the reasonable doubt
standardwe equa11yapposite,partl~
wbeo. as in me Georgia statute,
dJe burden is placed, not on the State. but rathm-on the mdhrldJI.alwith
the disabOhy.
PersuadiJ'i a jury of the d8feGdant's mental refBrdarlon beyond a
TelSOoabledoubt was even more difficult in d1e instant cue when d1c
prosecution produced, as aD expert,
witness who offered . ",luesStimate"
that the defendant'sIQ is outside the TaDgeof mental retardation. Su
Petition AppUldix at 32L Particu]arJyif a defendantdoesnot have visibly
idcdfiable physical cJ18ncteristics-5ucl1asthe ~jal featuresassocia~
wtdI. Down s)'Ddro~uron
might well conclude mat such testimony
alone ~
Te8$onabJc
doubt.
I' Amici do nor sussestthat it wu the original intention ofdlc Gcorgja

.

legisJarure to thwart the lepi protection of individuals with mental
retardation. Seesupra note 14.
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mental retardation "only" rises to the preponderanceor clear
and convincing level. This insistenceunderminesAIkins, and
for some defendantswith mental retardation, undeIminesit
fatally.
Viewed jn ligh':tof the competinginterestsof the indjvidual
defendants~ the State.20 the imbalance comes into even
clearcr focus. The defendant's interest is not only in life,
obviously the highest possible intaest,21but also in the right
of fair accessto an Eighth Amendmentprotection recognized
by this Court. What is the State's iDtcrest in imposing
the reasonabledoubt bmden on capital defendantsand thereby executing dcfmdants who have mental retardation but
cannot meet the elevated standard of JXOOf? The State's
brief in opposition articulates none. And the Georgia
SuprcmcCourt's ~tio!::!a1ecan be fairly paraphrasedas, "the
U.S. SupremeCourt hasnot yet prohibited it ~

10 "[A]n

examiJ2ation
of the interestsat stakein a partltular tase

becomes~~
to det£nnmmx die J)ro1)rletyof1he specified sandii'd of
proot:" Santosky,455 U.S. at 787 (RebDqulSt,J., dlssencq). 10 Cooper,
this CoW'( folmd a heightened b1D'deoon a d~dam
W1IJeceS5ary
to
"vindicate tbc State's inteRst in prompt aDd orderly disposition of
criminal cues." S17 U.S. at .360.
I obscrvcdthat "[{Jew forms of
21 Compare
Santosty,wh~ the Court
5t8tc action arc ~
SOsevwe aDd so breverslble [as the tcrmiDBdODof
paremal rigbrs]." 45' U.S. at 1S9.
12Scc Hcodv. RIa, 587 S.E.2d 613, 62.2(01. 2003). What amIci find
most remarkable is nOt that die 8t8te comt bad ~ed
a sJm1Jat
conclu,ion in 1997, su Moshv \I. STate,491 S.B.2d 348 (Ga. 1997), but rather
that it failed to perfotm cvm d1emost nldtm.tary dlle processanalysisin
2003, aftu this Court had recognized defendmts' Eighth Amendmerrt
inrcrat in ..4rkllU. Simply observing that ~
may be disazreementsin
iDdividual casesabOUt"determining which offBndef$are In fact retarded,"
Head, 587 S.E..2d at 622 (quotjng ..4tkim, 536 U.S. at 317), docs not
amount to a constitutionallDalysis of which party should bear dte risk of
an erroneousdet8l1DiDat1on.
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D. Tbd Court's CUts Regardina:Due Processand
Burdens of PenuasioD Provide No Support for
Georgja's Procedure.
This Court has consideredthe application of due process
principJes to burdcns of persuasion in a variety of legal
contexts. Its decisions offer no support for Georgia's imposition of a reasonabledoubt burdenin Atkins cases.
As thc Court has noted, "adopting a standardof proof is
more than an empty semantic exercise. In casesinvolving
individual rights, whether crin'lin~1or civiJ, the standardof
proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on
individual liberty." .Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (mtemal
quotationsand citations omitted). And the iOJportance
of the
standard of proof is practical as well as symboUc.since "a
standard of proof rcpresentsan attempt to instruct the fact
finder concerningthe dciI'CCof confidenceour societythinks
he should have in the conectnessof factual concJusionsfor a
particular type of adjudication." in Fe Winship, 397 U.S. at
370 (Harlan, 1., concurring).The level of the burdenimposed
on a party reflects not on)y "the importance of a particular
adjudication, it also servesas a societaljudgment about how
the risk of error should be distributed betweenthe litigants.
The more stringentthe burden of proof a party must bear,the
more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision."
Cruzan y. Director, MLssouriDep'l of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
283 (1990) (internal citatjons and quotationsomitted).
This risk, of course.matters most in factually close cases.
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 366-67; Santosky,455 U.S. at 764. In
such cases.the constitutional issuc is whether the burdenthe
State has chosen "fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous
factfinding bctwccn thesetwo parties." Santosky,455 U.S. at
761. WhCl1.as in the casc at bar, thc individual interest is at
the highest IcvcI. "the social cost of even occasionalerror is
sizable." Id. at 764. Seegenerally Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283
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("An erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however,js not susceptibleof correction.").
Georgia imposes on defendantswith mental retardation
"8 markedly asymmetricalevidentiarybm'den,"see id at 316
(Brennan.J., dissenting),erecting an obstacleto even-handed
evaluation of their claim to protection from capital
punish_rncnt
underAtkins. It doesso offering no justification,
other than the implicit rationale that the State prefers
to imposethe deathpenalty.
CONCLUSION
In order to preclude more death sent~
lD)dcr this
patcntly unconstitutional standard,amici respectfully request
that the Court grant the petition and jssuethe writ.
Respectfullysubmitted,
JAMBSW. ElLIS *

. Counse1 of Record
Apri130. 2004

CAROLM. SUZUKI
NORMANBAY
CHRtmAN G. FRm
1117S18Df~ NE
Albuquel'qUc,NM 11131
(505) 277-2146
CoW1HIfor .Amici CIOil¥

